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*A.J.I.C.L. 582 I. INTRODUCTION
Poverty, narrowly defined is the lack of physical, human and social capital to meet basic needs.1 In
Botswana, few women own land, which is a strong indicator of physical capital, and those who are
owners only have secondary rights.2 This is despite recent land reforms3 and improved women's land
rights.4 As in many other countries, women face the burden of poverty and the proportion of female
headed households living in poverty is higher than that of male headed households.5 Predominantly a
rural country with only 22 per cent of its population residing in urban areas, among other problems
women in Botswana have a lower employment rate to population and less income than men do.6
Hence women face an uphill battle in articulating their claims to equality and in ensuring that these
claims are legally enforceable.
Jurisprudence in Botswana regarding equality and women's rights has for many years been
dominated by the well-known case of Attorney General of Botswana *A.J.I.C.L. 583 v. Unity Dow. 7
In the Dow matter, the respondent challenged section 4 of the Citizenship Act,8 which precluded her
two children from becoming citizens of Botswana because their father was an American citizen and
this prevented her from passing on her citizenship. The High Court and later the Court of Appeal9 held
that section 15 of the Constitution of Botswana must be interpreted to include sex as a ground of
discrimination. This is because the makers of the Constitution would not have intended that equal
treatment of males and females be exempted from the prohibition of discriminatory laws and
discriminatory treatment found in subsections 15(1) or (2).10 Important for this discussion is that the
Court of Appeal rejected the appellant's argument that "sex' had been intentionally omitted from the
definition of discrimination in section 15(3) of the Constitution. The Court dismissed the appellant's
contention that the absence of "sex' as a grounds of discrimination was so as to accommodate,
subject to the fundamental rights protected by section 3 thereof, the patrilineal structure of Botswana
society, in terms of the, among others, customary law.11
In 2012, two decades after the historic Dow judgment, the High Court of Botswana handed down
another ground-breaking judgment in Mmusi & Others v. Ramantele 12 that confirmed the position that
any unfair discrimination on the grounds of sex is intolerable in a Constitutional era. The Court of
Appeal (herein referred to as the Appeal Court)13 later agreed with this. This article examines the
relevance of these two decisions in light of women and customary law inheritance. While the decision
may be particular to Botswana, this article argues that there are lessons to be learnt from this case
that will be useful in any context in Africa when considering the implications of customary law
inheritance practices on human rights generally and women's rights specifically. Customary law
practices that deny women land rights contribute to the cycle of poverty that women in Africa face
daily and closer scrutiny of court decisions is necessary to enhance justice for women.
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This discussion begins with a description of customary law and its practices in relation to women in
Botswana and Southern Africa in general before delving into the history of the Mmusi case. The
protagonists in this case are four sisters who approached the High Court after failed efforts to prevent
their nephew Moelfi Ramantele from inheriting their parents' homestead (which two of them resided
on) by relying on the Ngwaketse custom. In terms of this custom, also known as ultimogeniture, the
youngest son of the deceased is entitled to succeed to the property of his deceased father. The
applicants sought to have the custom declared unconstitutional by relying on section 3(a) of the
Constitution of Botswana which protects the fundamental rights and freedom of the individual. In order
to comprehend the matter in its entirety, a succinct account of the background *A.J.I.C.L. 584
leading to the process in the High Court will be provided, with an additional discussion of the
arguments from both parties. While the High Court found that the custom was ultra vires in terms of
section 3(a) of the Constitution, the reasoning of the Appeal Court took an entirely different direction.
It overturned the High Court judgment and found on the facts alone in favour of the sisters and
cautioned against the unnecessary use of constitutional interpretation. A critique of the Appeal Court
decision permits the extraction of four lessons that would be useful in future customary law
adjudication. The origin of each lesson will be identified from the judgment with an explanation of why
each is relevant to the future adjudication of customary law, not just in Botswana, but in Africa as a
whole.
The first lesson focuses on the requirement that evidence of a customary law practice must be
adduced in court. The Appeal Court found that the evidence in favour of the Ngwaketse custom was
lacking, and the author submits that this approach in some matters is not always practical. The High
Court's decision by Dingake J was heavily criticised by the Appeal Court for having unnecessarily
dealt with a constitutional question and this is where the second lesson emanates from. It is derived
from examining whether a constitutional question should always be asked by the courts in dealing
with matters before them. The third lesson investigates the governance of customary law and asks
who the customary law officers dispensing justice in these communities are, and whether or not they
are in a position to make the correct decisions. This is especially important because, prior to the High
Court application, the matter had been heard in three different customary courts with two of them
ruling that Ngwaketse customary law must be applied, which would have left the sisters with no
homestead. The events in customary courts have a great impact on litigants who often cannot afford
to approach the High Court for further relief if they feel aggrieved.
The final lesson situates these issues within the sphere of culture and identity, the central argument
relied on by Molefi Ramantele and the Attorney General, who were the appellants in the Appeal
Court. While culture is not static and changes with the times, there is resistance to such changes
because adjudication of said matters tends to be underpinned by a fear that the courts wish to
interfere with a community's culture and, inadvertently, its identity. The article will conclude by
providing recommendations that could be useful for courts to apply when adjudicating the relationship
between customary law and modern human rights principles.
A. An Overview
Most African legal systems are pluralistic and composed of African customary law, religious law,
common or civil law and legislation.14 There is no single *A.J.I.C.L. 585 definition of customary law
agreed upon by lawyers, jurists and anthropologists. Customary law includes the customs and
traditions of a people which play a crucial role in shaping their culture.15 These traditions and customs
are passed on over time from one generation to another in different contexts all over Africa. The living
customary law is dynamic and constantly adapting to changing social and economic conditions.
Himonga et al. argue that new customary norms are the product of the melding of local customs and
practices, religious norms and social and economic imperatives (and one may add constitutional
imperatives), with the result that living customary law is formed out of interactive social, economic and
legal forces which give it its flexibility in content.16 However, Joireman believes that customary law is
explicitly political and is best viewed as a battleground in the struggle for power within a society.17 He
submits that during the colonial era, customary law provided a way for older men within traditional
societies to reclaim some of the independence and control which they lost due to colonisation. They
were able to use customary law to assert control over women, younger men and children - the limited
realm over which they were given authority by the colonial power.18
This assertion of control still exists, with great impact on the lives of the majority of African women in
the area of personal law in regard to matters such as marriage, inheritance and traditional authority.19
Though some positive aspects of customary law include the emphasis on community and duties of
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individuals towards communities, customary law does also contain gender discriminatory practices
that impede on women's dignity. Prevalent practises regarding women include the payment of bride
price (also known as lobolo 20), widow's inheritance (also known as levirate 21) and initiation
ceremonies when a girl reaches adolescence. In relation to property rights, sub-Saharan countries'
notions of culture and tradition nearly always require the transfer of power, land and property to men
alone.22 In addition, the administration of customary law is done through traditional leaders called
village chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen whose positions are hereditary - passed on from father to son.
23 It is a rare *A.J.I.C.L. 586 occurrence to find a female sub-chief or headperson, which further
removes women from the processes of determining how customary law is applied to them.
Women are sometimes viewed as an addition to their tribe or clan as opposed to equals in their own
right. Hence, once a woman is married she becomes part of her husband's family and falls under his
guardianship. An unmarried woman remains under her father's guardianship and control, so a woman
effectively always has a male head over her.24 When this male head dies, if he dies intestate - as
often occurs in areas where customary law is practised - the woman is likely to get very little. She is
disinherited of any land her husband or father may have owned, any houses, including the home she
lives in, cattle, vehicles (if any) and any other property. Further, inheritance claims made by male
family members are often selfserving because men view themselves not only as successors to the
status of the deceased but also to the ownership of property.25
While some customs are widespread and have been in existence for years, the enactment of more
progressive constitutions has drawn scrutiny to longaccepted but unjust practices. In South Africa, for
example, this old order underwent its first Constitutional Court challenge in Bhe and Others v.
Magistrate Khayelitsha and Others. 26 In this case the applicants challenged the customary law of
male primogeniture27 that excludes females from inheriting the deceased's main possessions.28 The
majority judgment held that the customary law of primogeniture discriminates unfairly against children
born out of wedlock and women, and that excluding women from inheritance on grounds of gender
was a clear violation of section 9(3) of the South African Constitution which prohibits discrimination on
various grounds.29 Former Chief Justice Pius Langa went further to state that this exclusion is a form
of discrimination that entrenches past patterns of disadvantage among a vulnerable group
exacerbated by old notions of patriarchy and male domination. This, he held, was incompatible with
the guarantee of equality under the constitutional order.30
Bhe paved the way for a new approach to discriminatory customary law practices in South Africa.
However, it is not the only country in the region that has shown positive outcomes in this regard. The
Kenyan Constitution contains a Bill of Rights that overrules customary law norms that conflict with
constitutional provisions by stating that "… any law including customary law that is inconsistent with
this Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency and any act or omission in contravention of
this Constitution is invalid.'31 The Constitution *A.J.I.C.L. 587 of Malawi states that in the application
and development of, among others, customary law, the relevant organs of state shall have due regard
to the principles and provisions of the Constitution.32 Further to the west of Africa, Ghana is widely
seen as a leader in the struggle for inheritance rights because its Constitution states that "[s]pouses
shall have equal access to property jointly acquired during marriage' and that "[a] spouse shall not be
deprived of a reasonable provision out of the estate of a spouse whether or not the spouse died
having made a will.'33 Conversely, others such as the Zambian Constitution34 contain an exemption for
the application of customary law by stating that the anti-discrimination clause provided in the Bill of
Rights does not apply "with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on
death or other matters of personal law'.35
B. The Law in Botswana
Like most African countries, Botswana has a pluralistic legal system comprised of five primary
sources, namely the Constitution, Roman Dutch law, statutory law passed by parliament, case law
and customary law.36 Regarding customary law, Griffiths writes that in Botswana women generally
occupy a subordinate position in comparison with men. This encompasses the management of and
control over economic resources and also extends to family life.37 Hence women have limited
authority in their homes, their tribes or clans and over immovable and movable property.
Mafhoko-Ditsa argues that current poverty measures in Botswana do not adequately depict women's
vulnerability to poverty38 and there is a lack of appreciation of the effect of discriminatory social
norms.39 The Constitutional aspect of Tswana Law prohibits discrimination in section 15(1) of the
Constitution.40 It states that subject to the particular subsections,41 "no law shall make any provision
that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.' There are, however, exemptions in this section,
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with one being subsection (4) which states that:
Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to any law so far as that law makes provision -
(d) for the application in the case of members of a particular race, community or tribe of customary
law with respect to *A.J.I.C.L. 588 any matter whether to the exclusion of any law in respect to that
matter which is applicable in the case of other persons …
In addition, while section 15(3) defines discrimination as affording different treatment to people on
various grounds including race and political opinion, sex or gender was previously omitted as an
express ground for discrimination.42 Customary law is governed by the Customary Courts as
described in the African (Customary) Courts Proclamation of 1961.43 The Customary Law Act44 is the
legislation that was promulgated to oversee and administer the application of customary law in
Botswana.45 Section 2 contains the interpretation clause which states that:
"Customary law' means in relation to any particular tribe or tribal community, the customary law of that
tribe or community in so far as it is not incompatible with the provisions of any written law or contrary
to morality, humanity or natural justice.
Section 4 of the Customary Law Act provides that subject to three exceptions, customary law shall be
applicable in all civil cases and proceedings where the parties thereto are "tribesmen'. These
exceptions include an express agreement or relevant circumstances that show that parties would
want the matter regulated by common law, where the "transaction' in question is unknown to
customary law and thirdly where all parties express consent to the common law being applicable.46
The use of the word "tribesmen' in this Act further buttresses the ties between customary law and
culture and identity, which will be discussed in length later.
III. MMUSI AND OTHERS v. RAMANTELE AND OTHERS: FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Edith Mmusi (the first applicant in the High Court), her three sisters and brother Banki were born to
Sibalo Ramantele and Theswane Ramantele, who died in 1952 and 1988 respectively. Their father
bore a son with another woman before they were born - one Segomotso Ramantele - who was the
father of the respondent in this matter, Mr Molefi Ramantele. Segomotso never resided at the family
homestead in Mafhikana ward, and went to live in South Africa where he later died.47 The family lived
in their home in Mafhikana ward, Kanye, in the southern part of Botswana, until Edith moved out
when she married. Two of the three younger sisters later married and subsequently left the
homestead and so did Banki. After the death of her husband in 1988, Edith, a retired teacher, moved
back to the family home when she was 58 years old and was living there when this case came to
court.
*A.J.I.C.L. 589 After the death of their father, the four sisters took care of their widowed mother and
built a three-bedroom house on the property. Banki, who was the last-born, did not contribute to the
homestead and, in fact, refused to buy his mother fencing for the yard. In the year 2000, Edith Mmusi
built a house with four rooms at her parents' matrimonial homestead, fenced the home and built a
toilet and installed a tap.48 In 2006, when Segomotso Ramantele died, his son Molefi instituted
proceedings in the Lower Customary Court in Kanye asserting that he was entitled to the family
homestead as it had been bequeathed to his father by his uncle Banki. On 15 May 2007, the lower
Customary Court held that Molefi was entitled to the property because according to the Ngwaketse
culture, inheritance of the home was given to the youngest male child. This is because under
customary law, the consideration is that he never leaves the home, unlike a girl child whose
inheritance is derived from her marriage.49 The original homestead of Edith's parents was awarded to
Molefi because he was considered as the heir to Banki, who was his parents' last born.50 Edith was
given six months to decide what to do with the house which she had built on the plot.
This decision went on appeal to the main Customary Court in November 2008. Kgosi Lotlaamoreng
sitting in the court held that there had been no meeting to distribute the property of Edith's parents. As
a result, he decided that, regardless of the marital status of any of the children, the home belonged to
all the children born to Sibalo and Theswane Ramantele. He ordered that a meeting be convened by
the relevant elders present, for all concerned parties, in order to appoint a child who would look after
the home on behalf of the others.51 Mr Molefi (Edith's nephew) was dissatisfied with this decision and
appealed to the Customary Court of Appeal in Gaborone. In January 2009, the Customary Court of
Appeal dismissed the main Customary Court's judgment and found in favour of Mr Molefi, stating that
he was entitled to inherit the parents' homestead as per Ngwakeste customary law. The Court held
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that, by attempting to undo an agreement between the brothers (Molefi's father and his brother
Banki), Edith and her sisters were trying to change the Ngwaketse custom. He further stated that
women who had been married should not try to claim assets from their parents as this was contrary to
the cultural norm.52
A. The Applicants' and Respondents' Arguments
In 2010, Edith Mmusi and her sisters Bkhani Moima, Jane Lekoko and Mercy Ntshekisang were the
four applicants in the High Court seeking a declaration that the Ngwakestse customary law rule was
unconstitutional. They argued that the *A.J.I.C.L. 590 customary rule violated their right to equal
protection and treatment under the law in terms of section 3(a) of the Constitution of Botswana.
Counsel for the applicants argued that section 3(a) is a substantive section conferring rights on the
individual.53 He referred to precedent where the court held that all people must be treated equally54
and submitted that the UN Human Rights Committee55 had interpreted the right to equal protection as
not only providing for equality before the law but also as a guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against unfair discrimination on any of the enumerated grounds, including sex.56
Counsel further argued that section 3(a) could only be limited where the right at issue prejudiced the
rights and freedom of others and on the ground of public interest. He submitted to the court that
holding that women are equally entitled to inherit serves to broaden the rights of others and cannot be
said to be prejudicial to anybody. In conclusion, he referred to Bostwana's report to the Committee on
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in which
the government stated that:
In the traditional setup women have limited inheritance rights as evidence by the application of
customary law. In this regard the law tends to treat men and women differently. Upon the death of
their parents unmarried women are likely to be evicted by the heir.57
The reference to the CEDAW report was not fully elaborated thereafter, but the intention must have
been that the court view it as an admission by the government that the current inheritance system
was discriminatory. A system that admittedly evicted unmarried women from their parents' home
when their parents died could not possibly be in furtherance of the objectives of CEDAW.58
Signatories to the Convention are, among other things, instructed to undertake measures to eliminate
discrimination including enacting legislation and modifying of social and cultural patterns.59 While the
modification of this cultural pattern could not be done by the courts, a declaration from the courts with
regard to its unconstitutionality would be the first step in recognising the need for changes in the
system. This would be a useful step in convincing the legislatures to enact law that would clarify the
supremacy of equality and dignity above all else.
The first respondent's Heads of Argument emphasised that in defining equality, regard should be paid
to what is actually practised in the society and not necessarily what is written in law, as the meaning
of equality in any jurisdiction is influenced by the historical, socio-political and legal conditions of any
society *A.J.I.C.L. 591 concerned.60 Counsel further argued that the right to equality is the most
difficult right, as it promises more than it can deliver.61 Hence, although gender inequalities are still
visible in society, the court must be slow to upset entrenched customs such as the one under
consideration.62 He sought to persuade the court that the Customary Court of Appeal did not apply the
principle of male primogeniture as that differed from Ngwaketse customary law.
While male primogeniture gives all the deceased's inheritance to the first-born male, the family home
in the Ngwaketse culture was inherited by the last-born male child and the rest of the inheritance
distributed among his siblings. This, he maintained, was the difference between the two and hence
the distribution of the remaining inheritance among siblings in the Ngwaketse custom was the
legislator's method of putting women on a par with men. Despite an admission that, on the face of it,
the family home inheritance is based on gender and position of birth and amounts to differentiation,
he sustained that these inequalities were justifiable.63 He further added that the position of the last
born son is actually less favourable than that of other siblings because the inheritance of the property
comes with a condition that the property should be used by siblings in certain circumstances such as
weddings and funerals.
The second respondent was the Attorney General, who represented the Presiding Officer of the
Customary Court of Appeal. Counsel for the Attorney General stated that parliament must inevitably
take a moral position in tune with what it perceived to be the public mood. Counsel submitted that as
a result of Botswana's cultural inclination, the time had not come to consign the impugned Ngwaketse
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customary law to the dustbin of history.64 Customary law enjoyed the protection under section 15(4)(c)
and (d) of the Constitution65 and counsel insisted that since the section had been amended after the
Dow case to include "sex' as a ground of discrimination, the court was duty bound to apply the
exceptions as they stood. This in essence meant that the court should not consider the custom as
being discriminatory at all. The Attorney General's representative concluded by stating the Ngwaketse
custom was practised by 91 per cent of the population of Botswana who were descendants of the
Tswana- and Kalanga-speaking tribes. Therefore it would be absurd to expect the courts to condemn
such practices.66
B. The Judgment
Handed down in October 2012, Dingake J's ground-breaking judgment commenced with a thorough
interrogation of the concept of equality and stated that equality was better understood when applied in
context and not in the *A.J.I.C.L. 592 abstract.67 He made a distinction between formal and
substantive equality, highlighting that the latter required a thorough understanding of the impact of the
discriminatory action upon a particular category concerned.68 While not every differentiation amounts
to discrimination, the determining factors are the impact of the discrimination on the victims and the
value of dignity.69 Dingake J discussed constitutional interpretation in detail by quoting from the Dow
case, where Aguda JA stated that:
The courts must breathe life into [the Constitution] from time to time as the occasion may arise … We
must not shy away from the basic fact that whilst a particular construction of a constitutional provision
may be able to meet the demands of the society of a certain age, such construction may not meet
those of a later age.70
He defined customary law as per the Customary Law Act71 and stated that the Customary Act
preserves customary law that is not repugnant to written law, morality and justice. He further
determined the question before the court as "whether the rule that permits only the youngest male
son to inherit intestate is incompatible with the provisions of the written law?' Hethen referred to the
Constitution of Botswana72 and highlighted section 3 which protects the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the individual whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex.73
Therefore he pointed out that an understanding of section 3 required an examination of both Dow 74
and Student's Representative Council of Molepolole College of Education v. The Attorney General. 75
In the latter case, the court held that a regulation that discriminated against pregnant women and
affected their college attendance offended the provision of the Constitution in question. They
emphasised that if the framers of the Constitution had intended that men and women be treated
differently, they would have stated so in clear and unambiguous terms. Hence both women and men
were entitled to equal protection by the law.
Dingake J then undertook a lengthy comparative case law analysis of different jurisdictions with
specific reference to equality and freedom from discrimination.76 This included the South African case
of Bhe, 77 which Dingake J used to highlight the differences between the Constitution of Botswana
and the South African Constitution. The former constitution permits discrimination *A.J.I.C.L. 593
through the application of customary law,78 while the latter does not. This is why he clarified that the
applicants' focus was on section 3(a) - equal protection of the law - and not section 15 which is the
prohibition of discrimination clause. His analysis also referred to the Tanzanian case of Ephraim v.
Pastory 79 where the High Court considered the Haya customary law. According to this rule,
daughters had no power to sell inherited land and this was found to be inconsistent with the Bill of
Rights and regional and international law. Dingake J examined Bostwana's international and regional
obligations80 before stating that "it is axiomatic, that by ratifying the above international legal
instruments, state parties commit themselves to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct that
adversely affect women … '81 Hence the customary law practice in question needed to be considered
in light of those obligations.
He concluded by stating that Ngwaketse custom amounts to discrimination based on the prohibited
ground of gender in section 3(a) and a determination needs to be made as to whether it is justifiable.
The court was not persuaded that allowing other members the use of the family home for gatherings
(once inherited by the male heir) made the discrimination justifiable. It held that there was no
legitimate government purpose to be served by the discriminatory rule, as it was not only irrational but
an unjustifiable assault on the dignity of the applicants and women generally.82 The Customary Court
of Appeal order that required the first applicant to vacate the home was considered a gross form of
discrimination that could not be justified on the basis of culture because it infringed the sisters'
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fundamental right to equality and equal protection of the law.83 Therefore Dingake J found that the
custom violated section 3(a) of the Constitution and emphasised the urgent need for parliament to
abolish all laws that are inconsistent with section 3(a).84 The Ngwaketse rule in question was declared
ultra vires of section 3 and the Customary Court of Appeal ruling was set aside.
V. THE APPEAL COURT DECISION: CRITIQUE AND LESSONS LEARNT
The Attorney General, as second appellant in the Appeal Court,85 filed Heads of Argument stating that
the High Court erred by failing to take into consideration section 15(4)(c) of the Constitution that
contained the exemptions from the non-discrimination clause. According to her, the Ngwaketse
custom enjoyed the protection provided under section 15 and too much weight had been given
*A.J.I.C.L. 594 to international instruments and foreign decisions.86 Section 3 was viewed as
providing a general principle while section 15 was regarded as more specific. Hence, the second
appellant averred that the High Court had erred when it considered section 3 in isolation. In
conclusion, the Attorney General surmised that the inclusion of "sex' in section 15 subsequent to Dow
proved that this type of discrimination was still permissible under subsection 15(4) as the subsection
had not been removed by the legislators.
Counsel for the respondent countered this argument by alleging that first the appellants' Heads of
Argument87 were paradoxical and internally inconsistent because the first appellant argued that male
primogeniture did not exist in Ngwaketse customary law. Despite stating that primogeniture would be
intolerable under the Constitution, he sought to rely on male ultimogeniture to lay claim to the family
homestead.88 This, the appellant alleged, was why the respondents were disqualified from inheriting,
because none of them was the youngest male child. The respondents asserted that Ngwaketse
customary law, properly understood, is flexible and does not prescribe an invariable rule regarding
intestate inheritance. If customary law did prescribe such a rule, then it violated the fundamental
rights in sections 3 and 15 of the Constitution.89
On 3 September 2013, the Appeal Court handed down its decision.90 The conclusion to the Mmusi
case was not a confirmation of the High Court's decision declaring the Ngwaketse custom
unconstitutional as some would have hoped. It instead substituted the High Court decision with a
different order that included the declaration that Ngwaketse custom does not prevent female children
from inheriting the family home. It overturned the decision of the Customary Court of Appeal and held
that the facts of the transfer of the property from one brother to another had not been proved. Lastly,
the Appeal Court also upheld the decision of Kgosi Lotlaamoreng II of the Customary Court that had
stated that all children should share the distributable estate. A critique of the judgment follows in an
effort to derive four useful lessons.
A. Ascertaining Customary Law: Evidence Versus Practice
In the majority judgment written by Lesetedi JA,91 a major concern was the lack of what he considered
as proper evidence92 from the appellants and respondents regarding the practice of Ngwakeste
customary rule. The unanimous judgment *A.J.I.C.L. 595 stated that in the absence of evidence led
in the Customary Court of Appeal, it was unclear how the High Court was able to rely on papers filed
on record to determine the nature, scope and justification of the custom if there was one.93 Thus the
first aspect of the judgment to be examined is the issue of evidence and what the Appeal Court
referred to as the lack of substantial evidence to prove the practice of the Ngwaketse custom. People
of a particular tribe are privy to practices that relate to the administration of customary law in their
areas. Often, these customary laws are unwritten. Yet a majority of Africans identify with customary
laws and conduct their lives in confirmation with them. Consequently, an approach by the courts to try
to adapt strict legal evidential rules as applied in common law may not always result in obtaining the
best evidence.94
The Appeal Court stated that a court should not be quick to consider the constitutionality of customary
law unless it is possessed with the existence, content, rationale and application of the custom.
Lesetedi JA found that no evidence was led in the Customary Court to show the existence of such a
rule and that the three tiers of the customary court system could not agree on its existence, let alone
its application to this case.95 The Appeal Court decided that Dingake J erred in this regard because
the practice of the Ngwaketse custom had not been proved. Despite the Appeal Court's lack of
satisfaction with the evidence led to adduce the customary law, it cannot be stated for a fact that the
custom does not exist, and this is the first important lesson of this case. Both parties to the matter
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indicated that it was a practice in their affidavits and the Attorney General's Heads of Argument did
not dispute the custom but rather defended it.
The Attorney General submitted that 91 per cent of the population of Botswana were descendants of
the Tswana- and Kalanga-speaking tribes that practised the rule that sought to be impugned.96
Discrepancies with regard to the facts of how the said property may or may not have been distributed
in the Customary Courts are acknowledged by the author,97 yet this does not negate the fact that the
dispute over the home arose because of the expectations emanating from the Ngwaketse custom. As
Himonga et al. submit, customary law rules differ from customs because customary law rules require
a convergence of behaviour, which when deviated from is met with pressure of conformity.98 The
Customary Appeal Court's verdict in alleging that Edith Mmusi was trying to change the Ngwaketse
culture is itself an indication of the pressure to conform to the rules. Himonga and Pope99 also
emphasise that the ascertainment of customary law requires that a court determines whether the
alleged rule is indeed a law as defined by the community, as the source of living customary law is the
community itself.
*A.J.I.C.L. 596 The existence of the Ngwaketse custom was further confirmed in an interview with
counsel100 for the applicants in the High Court (respondents in the Appeal Court). Counsel dismissed
any possibility that the rule did not exist and further stated that "people in communities feel it is their
own custom and that it should not be challenged; it is practised in communities all over Botswana and
women know this.' Griffiths, a legal anthropologist, also chronicles her experience researching
customary law disputes in Molepolole, Botswana's biggest village that lies in the south-east of the
country. She writes that women find themselves operating within a gendered environment where men
generally have better access to resources than them.101 Her research focuses on two inheritance
cases that not only depict the customary law rules in practice but also demonstrate that customary
law can accommodate changing times.
In the Mmusi case, perhaps the High Court should have required that the evidence be adduced to
substantiate the rule in question by way of requesting witnesses from the community to testify before
it. This witness base would, however, have to be broad-based to include both women and children.102
On the other hand, if the parties to the matter were not in dispute as regards the existence of the rule,
calling witnesses may have further prolonged an already drawn-out process. Thus the courts need to
be wary not to dismiss the existence of a customary law rule based on the evidence or lack thereof
that they have before them because what the courts might dismiss due to the failure to meet
evidential rules is in fact the lived reality of numerous people.103 Post-colonial official customary law
has been distorted and a reliance on this distorted law, to the detriment of current practices in
communities, will only place women in further peril.
B. Asking the Constitutional Question: Is It Really Necessary?
The second lesson learnt from the Appeal Court decision relates to the respondent's bid to have the
Ngwaketse rule declared unconstitutional in the High Court. Lesetedi JA stated that where it is
possible, if a case can be heard before the court without having to decide a constitutional question,
the court must follow that approach.104 The constitutional question was regarded as irrelevant to the
real dispute between the parties when viewed in light of the evidence called at the court of first
instance,105 because the resolution of the case turned mainly on the facts.106 Kirby JP in his
concurring judgment also added that where a case can be resolved *A.J.I.C.L. 597 and appropriate
leave can be granted by an appeal or by review proceedings, even if constitutional issues are raised
among others, that is the procedure to be adopted.107
Even though he had already arrived at that conclusion, Lesetedi JA went on to stipulate what
requirements would have had to be satisfied by the appellants before a constitutional question was
even asked. Crucial to this is the fact that while the first respondent has been in undisturbed
possession of the property for over twenty years, no evidence was led of the distribution of the
property to Banki by Sibalo Ramantele.108 He asserted that the lack of evidence regarding the transfer
of property should have ended the matter with no need to delve further into the implications of what
the disinheritance would have done to the respondents.
The court referred to S v. Mhlungu and Others, 109 where Mohammed J held that "as a general
principle, where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional
issue that is the course which should be followed.' The general idea is that constitutional challenges
are a serious step and their decisions have a great impact, hence settling the matter at a more basic
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level is preferred.110 Counsel for Edith Mmusi and her sisters submitted that the question of fairness
should have been asked in the High Court before a constitutional question was posed.111 Thus
Dingake J should have been asking whether the alleged Ngwaketse custom met the interpretation of
the Customary Law Act as regards whether it was contrary to natural justice, morality or humanity.
While the respondents (applicants in the High Court) stated that there was a constitutional question in
the matter, it is the judge's role to hone in on the relevant issues so as to ensure the advancement of
the determination of the case.
Avoiding a constitutional issue if possible is not just pragmatic but also has the advantage of reducing
the length of the trial and the costs to litigants. The matter first went to the Customary Court in 2007,
but a dispute over the homestead had arisen as early as 1999.112 This dispute arose eight years after
the first respondent had been in undisturbed possession of the property and only came to finality 14
years after the problems commenced. The respondents are all advanced in age and avoiding a
constitutional question could have concluded the dispute swiftly. It is important to note that most
women challenging customary law practices are indigent and are often represented pro bono. The
respondents in this case were aided by the Botswana Teachers Union who assisted with costs in the
High Court and pro bono representation from the Southern African Litigation Centre *A.J.I.C.L. 598
in the Court of Appeal.113 Therefore the need to avoid deciding an irrelevant constitutional question
saves time and money for people who cannot afford to endure a lengthy litigation process.114
C. The Adjudication of Customary Law: Is It Fair?
The administration of customary law is mostly done by men who sit as councillors, headmen and
presiding officers in various kgotlas 115 and courts in Botswana. While they may be well versed in
custom and cultural practices, this expertise does not necessarily extend to the other four primary
sources of law in Botswana.116 The Appeal Court stated that if the customary law rule did exist, a
consideration of whether it satisfied the legal test to constitute an enforceable customary law would
have to be made. The test involves using the definition of customary law in the Act117 read with
section 10(2) of the same Act. Section 10(2) states that:
If the system of customary law cannot be ascertained in accordance with subsection (1) or if the
customary law is not ascertainable, the court shall determine the matter in accordance with the
principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
Using the two sections, the court found that a customary law rule that denies children who have
played a major role in developing a particular part of the estate in favour of a child who had not played
any part goes against the notions of fairness, equity and good conscience.118
The Appeal Court rightly pointed out the legal test to be used as regards section 10(2) of the
Customary Law Act, but it is striking that none of the Customary Courts used the interpretative section
of the Customary Law Act. The lesson here is that as the gatekeepers of customary law, presiding
officers are not acquainted with how to interpret customary law in order to ensure that is not
incompatible with the provisions of written law or contrary to humanity or natural justice.119 When the
author spoke to Mr Tshiamo Rantao120 about this omission in the Customary Court, he explained that
Customary Courts are clueless as regards the application of the Customary Law Act and are not
aware of the test that is provided. He further contended that laws are written in English, but the
presiding officers often use vernacular which further complicates the use of the Customary *A.J.I.C.L.
599 Law Act. This problem invariably leads to unfair results and hence there is an urgent need to
educate Customary Court officials on the Act and perhaps provide a translation of the Act in the local
languages.121
Further, a judge in the Botswana High Court revealed that "although customary law must always be
applied in the context of the Constitution, few if any of the presiding officers have read the constitution
or understand its nature and character and how it relates to other laws including customary law.'122
This admission not only supports Mr Rantao's observation but raises questions as to how many
disputes that did not go further than the Customary Appeal court have been decided in accordance
with the law. Perhaps, as Mbatha argues, some judges disregard the negative effect of their decisions
on women's property rights because they may not be experienced in constitutional law.123 Customary
Courts are the courts of first instance for a large number of Tswana citizens and in most cases those
are the only courts before which they appear. Therefore it becomes crucial to adequately train
presiding officers and to ensure that they are well versed in legislation that relates to the
administration of customary law and constitutional obligations. Otherwise the administration of justice,
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equity and fairness will be further obstructed due to an application of a legal system in Customary
Courts that shuns changing developments in human rights. The consequences of this obstruction will
invariably be borne by women primarily, because of societal inequality.
D. Culture and Identity: Adjusting to Changing Times
It is noteworthy that in the High Court, both counsel for the two respondents (appellants in the Appeal
Court) admitted that women were treated differently with regard to the Ngwaketse custom, and both
referred to the public mood or societal concerns. By suggesting that the custom should not be
impugned because Botswana was culturally inclined, the Attorney General implied that culture can
and should be a valid reason for discrimination. Her office made the same argument 21 years ago in
the Dow case. The Attorney General at that time famously stated that "it is not unfair to say that if
gender discrimination were outlawed in customary law, very little of customary law would be left at all.'
124 Interestingly, despite the lapse of two decades and the constitutional progress in Botswana and
regionally during this period, the Attorney General's office still sought to use culture as a valid reason
to condone discrimination on the basis of sex.
The Appeal Court dealt with this issue aptly and provided us with the final lesson. The court said that
customary law is not static, but rather develops and modernises with time. Harsh and inhumane
aspects of custom, the Court held, are *A.J.I.C.L. 600 discarded as time goes on.125 Customary law
needs to respond to changing times and to understand existing social and economic conditions.
Lesetedi JA stated that customs are continuously modified on a case-by-case basis to keep pace with
the times and that customary law was developed to protect the community's social fabric and
cohesion. Kirby JP gave examples of instances in Botswana where customary law has changed to
accommodate changing times even in inheritance matters.126 This includes the modification of the
stated the rule of thumb that the youngest son inherits the family home.
In Alexkor Ltd and Another v. Richtersveld Community and Others, 127 the South African
Constitutional Court emphasised that:
Indigenous law is not a fixed body of formally classified and easily ascertainable rules. By its very
nature it evolves as the people who live by its norms change their patterns of life.
Twinomugisha observes that where inflexibility to change is noticed, there is a narrow interpretation of
customary law. This presents it as rigid, inflexible and oppressive and ignores its potential to improve
the quality of life of disadvantaged and marginalised groups.128 Such interpretations fail to recognise
that customary law is capable of transformation in response to changing circumstances.
A customary law dispute that arose in 1989 in the village of Molepolole, Botswana provides a fitting
example of such a transformation. Goitsemang and her brother David sought a resolution through an
informal hearing with members of the kgotla. 129 Goitsemang built up the family compound and
established a house with her earnings with no help from her brothers. Her brother David argued that
under customary law the household fell under his control because he was male and should be the
heir. Despite different views expressed by the kgotla councillors, it was clear that division of the family
property had become more complex, and some of these changes reflected altered life experiences in
which the number of women getting married was on the decline.130 Goitsemang as an unmarried
woman was still associated with the natal household. David, who had appealed to tradition for his own
benefit, now became constrained by it. The councillors found that a man of David's age, with his skills
(as a lawyer), was expected to have built his own household and his sister's investment in the
property meant she should control it. Here, customary law was flexible enough to accommodate her
claims thus proving that, in practice, it need not act to the detriment of women.
Closely related to the issue of accepting the flexible nature of customary law is the fear that changing
customary law rules will inadvertently mean losing cultural ties. Cultural relativism is the standard
defence when customary law rules are *A.J.I.C.L. 601 placed under a human rights lens.131 This was
depicted in the Mmusi case and is widely used to seek condonation for traditional and religious
practices that are harmful to women. In this regard, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Protocol for Women)132 has been commendable by
enshrining the right to a positive culture. Article 17(1) states that "Women shall have the right to live in
a positive cultural context and to participate at all levels in the determination of cultural policies.'133
This recognises the importance of culture and community to African women and avoids throwing the
baby out with the bath water.134 Although Botswana has not ratified the Protocol for Women, the steps
taken in the Mmusi case are consistent with the need to ensure a positive cultural environment is
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created for all women to enable them to lead a life free of discrimination. A positive culture free of
discrimination will convey to women that they are of equal worth, are equal to men and affirm their
dignity.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the four lessons referred to above, it is imperative that courts consider each one when
adjudicating customary law issues before them. In addition, to avoid instances where it is difficult to
ascertain whether the customary rule does exist, the witness base needs to be broadened. To do this,
courts would need to adopt procedures of taking evidence that are gender and age-sensitive.135 This
is because the culture of many African societies inhibits free communication in some cases by men or
women in the presence of people of the opposite sex and by children in the presence of adults.136
Such a step would ensure that reliance is placed on the actual people living in the communities as
opposed to outdated writing.137 If written customary law us to be a source, it should be that of current
works from scholars who have or are engaged with community practices and can attest to the current
customs. Secondly, there is a need to adopt guidelines that ought to be considered in determining the
content of a customary norm. Part of the problem in the Mmusi case was that there were no fixed
criteria to determine the Ngwaketse culture, which resulted in a decision stating that it does not exist
even when it does.
*A.J.I.C.L. 602 Van der Westhizen J in Shilubana v. Nwamitwa 138 suggested four factors that ought
to be considered in determining the content of a customary norm. These factors require a
consideration of:
• the traditions of the community concerned;
• the possible distortion of records due to colonial experience;
• the need to allow communities to develop customary norms; and
• the fact that customary law, like any other law, regulates the lives of people.
Having a consideration of the community concerned would require an in depth analysis of how the
members of the tribe or clan commonly handle inheritance matters. However, different factors will
come into play at different times in varied contexts hence this must be borne in mind when
determining a customary norm. Thirdly, the recognition that records could be distorted due to colonial
experience would require a greater focus on oral testimony as opposed to records from years back.139
Allowing communities to develop customary norms would be crucial for women. It is essential that
women are allowed to play a huge role in customary rule formulation and a court should seek to
establish whether or not this has been possible. Finally, it is necessary for the courts to always bear in
mind that customary law regulates the lives of people who, in most cases, are not affluent or
educated. Therefore the courts should endeavour to critically engage with their experiences and their
understanding of customary law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Edith Mmusi used her retirement fund to build a house on her parent's homestead where she has had
undisturbed possession for more than two decades. Yet had the matter not proceeded beyond the
Customary Court of Appeal, she would have found herself destitute and homeless despite the fact
that her nephew and his deceased father contributed nothing to the maintenance of the homestead.
In the Mmusi case, the Appeal Court's unanimous decision that the Ngwaketse custom would not
have passed the interpretive test in the Customary Law Act was a triumph. In addition, the declaration
that any customary law unjustly discriminating against women solely on the basis of their gender
would violate the Constitution was a welcome relief for the sisters who had waited for finality
regarding this dispute and for women in Botswana in general. However, it was also a reminder that
customary law still has its challenges and that women have to endure practices that impoverish them
based on their sex. These practices contribute to the feminisation of poverty and stunted economic
development in countries around the continent.
*A.J.I.C.L. 603 This article has attempted to highlight four lessons that have been learnt from the
Mmusi case. There is a need to identify the existence of customary law rules even if there is
insufficient evidence present in court to confirm their existence. This is critical to a proper adjudication
of inheritance matters. While judges who are progressive and who seek to champion the cause for
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human rights are applauded, great care must be taken in ensuring that the case before them cannot
be resolved without a constitutional challenge. The presence of a repugnancy clause in the
Customary Law Act140 meant that the Mmusi case was resolved by the Appeal Court to the exclusion
of the Constitution. However, this approach may also have its disadvantages.141 The author maintains
that if a proper construction of the issues at hand can be elicited without delving into a constitutional
issue that should be the preferred approach. However, for this approach to be viable, the proper
regulation of customary law in lower courts will be crucial to the adjudication of cases. Proper training
of presiding officers to ensure that they have a thorough understanding of the Customary Law Act,
especially its interpretive provision, will also go a long way in ensuring that disputes do not have to
reach the higher courts because they would have been dealt with accordingly in the lower courts. This
would require resolutions of disputes that are consistent with the protection of human rights and
consideration of the needs of vulnerable people.
Advocating for a positive culture that acknowledges changing times and seeks to modify outdated and
inhumane practices would serve women better than dismissing all customary law rules as violations of
their rights. Where inheritance is considered, this would require acknowledging that families are not
as strongly knit as they used to be and that more and more women are unmarried or widowed. It
would also require a contemplation of the fact that women are more likely to take care of aging
parents and/or contribute to the family homestead and thus should be allowed to inherit from that to
which they contributed.142 A failure to do this would leave women as prisoners of an oppressive past.
143 This should not be allowed to prevail unquestioned.
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